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ABSTRACT 
What causes individuals to change age-old economic, political, and social institutions? 
"Radical" historians claim that economic elites use their political power to impose institutions that 
enable them to extract the "labor surplus" more easily. This sharply conflicts with many econom­
ists' belief that economic growth comes about as society adopts a new regime of rules so as to cap­
ture potential efficiency gains. Whereas previous economists and historians have not addressed 
each other's concerns, this paper tests these contending hypotheses using an example common to 
both literatures - fence laws. 
As demographic and economic changes permeated the postbellum South, many progressive 
farmers called on their state legislatures to adopt stock laws which would prohibit grazing animals 
on unfenced land. Focusing our attention on the same Georgia counties as previous historians have 
studied, we provide a more comprehensive analysis of the empirical data than has heretofore been
given. Previous research on what contemporaries called the fence question has portrayed the 
conflict as one between the "haves" and the "have nots" - wealthy landowners against yeoman 
farmers, tenants, and laborers - or betwe�n contending "cultures" - believers in a precapitalistic 
"household mode of production" against partisans of national and international capitalistic market 
relations. Our investigation of the qualitative and quantitative evidence shows that the two-class
interpretation is wrongly simple and the cultural gloss is simply wrong. The stock law created 
potential benefits which crossed class lines and there is little evidence that its opponents rejected 
the crass cash nexus. The debate, therefore, was not rooted in class conflict, but stemmed from the 
materialistic goals of individuals concerned about the equitable distribution of costs and benefits of 
fencing crops and animals. 
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"Let us suppose that a fanner and [a] cattle-raiser are operating on neighboring 
properties. Let us further suppose that, without any fencing between the properties, an 
increase in the size of the cattle-raiser's herd increases the total damage to the fanner's 
crops .... The real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to hann B or 
should B be allowed to hann A? The problem is to avoid the more serious hann."1 
-Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of I.aw and Economics. 3 
(October 1960), pp. 2-3. The order of the two sentences has been rearranged. 
"What underlay contention over the material consequences of the stock law was 
considerably different, and increasingly antagonistic, ideas about social relations and 
property rights .... The freedom to which [stock law opponents] adhered was not merely 
that founded upon ownership of one's person and exchange in the marketplace, but that 
founded upon control over productive resources, labor time, and subsistence which, in 
tum, could be realized only through membership in the commonwealth of producers. 
The stock-law controversy set the republicanism of those producers against the values of 
the free market" 
- Steven H. Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the 
Transformation of the Georgia Upcountry, 1850-1890 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1984), pp. 250, 254. 
Economists and Historians on the Fence 
Economists and labor historians have viewed the topics of property rights and institutional 
change quite differently. While economists' often theoretical accounts have stressed efficiency and 
bargaining between self-interested individuals, historians, no less abstract, but more in the tradition 
of Karl Marx than of Ronald Coase, have highlighted distributional issues and conflicts between 
classes that represented, some historians assert, contending cultures. To economists such as Lance 
Davis and Douglass North, shifts in relative prices and discoveries of new opportunities for gain tend 
to induce alterations in institutions so as to foster economic growth.2 To "radical" historians, such as 
Steven Hahn, elites used their political dominance to substitute a capitalist for a cooperative, 
non-profit-oriented "household mode of production" in order to control labor more easily, and 
thereby to facilitate their exploitation of the "labor surplus." 
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These two conflicting views are not incommensurable. They do not represent incompatible 
rhetorics, or "different tropes for different folks," as Donald N. McCloskey might express it. 3 Even 
though labor historians have heretofore not directly confronted the economists' contentions, both 
schools have examined a common example, fence laws, and the accounts of both contain serious 
deficiencies. This paper seeks to combine the theoretical insights of the economics literature with 
the empirical richness of the historians' research mode to provide a new, more comprehensive 
account of the fence law debate in the postbellum South, a debate in which Hahn and others have
discerned "the roots of southern Populism." 
For evidence of contemporary behavior, we will draw not only on economic and political 
statistics but also on a startlingly rich debate over the fence laws conducted by partisans of the two 
sides in local newspapers. That late nineteenth century Georgia backwoodsmen demonstrably 
understood all the economic subtleties of the fence problem and the consequences of changing their 
economic, political, and social institutions should both cheer and chasten us - the former because 
their statements demonstrate the ubiquity of economic reasoning and the rationality and vigor of 
democratic debate during the 1880s, the latter because our models a century later are no more 
sophisticated. 
Historians' Explanations of the Fence Law Struggle 
Hailed as an important reinterpretation of postbellum southern society and politics, Steven 
H. Hahn's prize-winning Roots af Southern Populism puts major emphasis on what is in essence a 
simple question of tort law: Would owners of livestock be liable for damages to other people's crops 
if they did not fence in their animals (which was referred to as the "stock law") or did crop--0wners 
have to fence out other people's cattle and swine (the "fence law")?" Before 1872 in most of 
sparsely-settled Georgia, the open range or fence law position prevailed. After 1872, when the state 
legislature passed a general act allowing citizens in each county to petition to hold referenda on the 
question, an increasing number of counties, and later distticts within counties, adopted stock laws 
that shifted property rights to crop-growers and town-dwellers, and away from owners of livestock. 5 
Debates over this question, Hahn contends, reflected struggles between an "agrarian bourgeoisie," on 
the one hand, and those who believed in "a cooperative principle that challenged the tenets of 
bourgeois individualism and property, that challenged the hegemony of the marlcetplace," on the 
other. The fence law contests "paved the road to Populism. "6 Actually devoting little direct
attention to Populism itself, Hahn concentrates on two small counties in the Georgia hills, Carroll
and Jackson, and for obvious reasons we focus our attention on the same two counties. 
Charles L. Flynn, Jr. also highlights the fence law problem, which he refers to as "the 
bitterest political issue in Georgia politics between Redemption and the Populist Revolt of the 
1890s. "7 But ir.stead of a syu1bolic cuitural battle, Fiynn. sees the contest as a pureiy materiaiistic 
class conflict between relatively affluent landowners, on one side, and landless or land-poor whites 
and blacks, on the other. Although he admits the validity of some of the arguments of the stock law 
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proponents, Flynn judges partisans of that position "at least indifferent to the burdens that the change 
placed upon the poor. "8 As the controversy spread from the more thickly settled, less heavily 
forested black belt to the still developing hill country, it shifted from a predominantly racial contest 
to one primarily between different classes of whites. "The fence-law controversy," Flynn contends, 
"illustrated the intersecting class and racial division in the life of the New South." While the stock 
law men wished to minimize the expense of fencing and the losses from scrawny, ill-bred, 
marauding animals, fence law advocates feared high charges by landlords or large fanners for 
penned, watered grazing space if the fence law were repealed.9 
Reviewing two centuries of southern grazing laws, J. Crawford King, Jr. details the gradual 
closing of the southern range.10 Rather than analyzing what each side said were its reasons for 
acting, King divides the counties of Alabama and Mississippi in 1880 into those that partially or 
wholly adopted the stock law and those where no animal had to be fenced in, and compares several 
of the objective traits of the two groups of counties: population density, racial proportions, farm 
tenure arrangements and size, intensity of cultivation and concentration on cotton, and stock 
(especially hogs) per person. Unfortunately, he does not employ any multivariate methods or 
explicit statistical models, but only a series of contrasts between the mean values of each variable in 
the two sets of counties. 11 Although King concludes that his results "suggest a much more complex 
interpretation than the simplistic and somewhat artificial picture of battle between 'haves' and 
'have-nots'," he does not flesh out such an interpretation himself.12 
In another analysis of the fence question, James C. Bonner views the debate as a conflict 
mainly between "small farmers in isolated areas and those living in more densely populated areas."13 
Before the Civil War, agriculture had dominated the southern economy. After 1865, southern 
fanners suffered from periodic depressions at the same time that railroad mileage, town population,
and industries were expanding. This uneven development created a "rural-urban schism" that 
manifested itself in the local debate over the fence issue. The Populists' relative success in Carroll 
county, Georgia in the 1890s, according to Bonner, was the climactic result of class conflicts that 
began to develop during local battles to close the open range.14 Expressing many of the core ideas 
later generalized to the entire South and expressed more vividly by Hahn, Bonner's 1971 monograph 
attracted much less attention than Hahn's 1984 work.
Economic Theories or Property Rights and Institutional Change 
The neoclassical literature on property rights and institutional change begins with Coase's 
seminal paper. Coase argues that as long as transactions costs are zero or at least very small, the 
initial assignment of property rights does not matter because agents can voluntarily reach an 
agreement that maximizes their joint production. 15 To give a simplistic example, suppose that there 
are two college students who live next door to each other in a donnitory. One likes to sleep late in 
the morning and to stay up late at night, while the other rises early and retires early. Both have 
stereos, which they prefer to play at high volume. But, given thin walls in the building and their
opposed schedules, they quickly agree that, while both can play music loud during the middle of the 
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day, neither will do so early or late. Titis voluntary agreement among two people is obviously easy 
to negotiate and enforce. It suggests, by contrast, the difficulties that might arise when this 
extremely uncomplicated situation is altered by relaxing the implicit assumption that each party is 
equally able to negotiate the contract, by multiplying the number of people involved, by making 
information less easy to obtain, or by increasing the costs of supervision and/or enforcement. 
Alternatively, when transactions costs are sufficiently high, the assignment of property rights 
becomes crucial, as different assignments may lead to quite different allocations of resources, levels 
of production, and distributions of burdens and benefits. Clearly, the assumption that transactions 
costs are small is difficult to apply to almost any historical or contemporary situation. However, 
Coase's work offers insight into the various problems that arise when parties are unable to negotiate 
effectively a Pareto-improving contract.16 
The effects on efficiency were understandably great when animals were free to roam the 
open range and farmers were required to enclose their crops. Following Gordon, we can sketch the 
theoretical problems that arise when animal owners have free access to exploit the "common pool."17 
If we assume, as economists typically do, that individuals do not take into account the costs that they
impose on others, then in a "common pool" setting, they will equate only their own private marginal 
benefits to the private marginal costs of grazing animals. The result will be inordinate short-term 
exploitation of the land with little long-term investment to restore it. If there are no exclusive
property rights, because animals can graze in any unfenced area, every individual person will have
an incentive to increase his herd to higher levels than he would if he had to provide all the foraging
himself. In more technical terms, such an institutional arrangement encourages stockowners to 
create negative externalities for other people and not to take into account the full social costs of 
keeping animals. Therefore, as displayed in Figure l ,  animal owners will carry a herd size of A*, 
whereas A is the socially optimal size.18 Thus, there will be an overinvestment in animals under the 
open range system. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
Alternatively, farmers who must fence out the animals will not expect to receive a "normal" 
rate of return, and will underinvest in improvements on their land, or, what amounts to the same 
thing, will be forced to overinvest in fencing, buckshot, and lawyers' fees. Tiris phenomenon is 
pictured in Figure 2. Because of the wedge created between the private and social marginal benefits 
(i.e., the farmer is unable to realize all of the benefits from his land because marauding animals are 
extracting some of the benefits), an individual farmer will invest in L" of land, while L would be the 
socially optimal amount. Thus, future generations will be robbed to allow for the rapid exploitation
of resources in the present, and land, labor, and capital will be socially misallocated to erecting long, 
sinuous fences around crops in order to protect against the violation of ill-defined rights. 
(Figure 2 about here) 
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Since the large number of participants, each trying to transfer his own cost onto others, 
makes private contracts in this setting WJStable, government intervention becomes necessary to 
enforce strict property rights or contracts between the different bargaining parties. However, as the 
relative strength of the competing groups differs, the government's ultimate decision is likely to be 
influenced by the power of each individual group.19 The final allocation of property rights dictated 
by the government, therefore, may not conform to the one which maximizes social welfare. w 
What will cause people to seek a change in the status quo in the first place? Davis and North 
theorize that institutional change will tend to come about when the net present value of a new regime 
of property rights exceeds the net present value of the traditional set of rights. 21 As the costs and
benefits are continuously changing under each institutional structure, the net present value 
calculation will become a dynamic process that individuals and groups constantly update. Examples 
of changes which might have encouraged groups in upcountry Georgia to reassess the costs and 
benefits of the open range and fence law include technological advances in agriculture or animal 
husbandry, improved transportation, and changes in the population density, the amount of improved 
acreage under cultivation, or the relative prices of certain commodities, such as timber, labor, 
animals, animal products, or agricultural produce. As more people occupied the same amount of 
land and the proportion of land under cultivation grew, for example, the probability that one man's 
animal would destroy another's crops would increase as well. Titis would, in turn, make the stock
law more attractive. 
Of course, realizing that a new institution is more valuable than the old one is quite different
from actually adopting the new, better regime. As individuals who would be adversely affected by 
the change seek a priori contracts for compensation, those who are destined to benefit must decide 
upon how much to pay, who should pay, and who should receive their payments. The "free rider"22
problem ultimately plagues the transition, as those who should be making the payment try to hold 
out and refuse to participate, hoping that their neighbors will pay the entire amount Thus, even
though an institution may be Pareto improving, there are difficult problems of free riding, 
distribution, equity, and fairness that must be resolved before all pertinent parties decide to undergo 
change voluntarily.23 At this point the impasse must be solved by a governmental arl>iter, but there 
is nothing to guarantee that the political solution adopted will be the most efficient or equitable one, 
or even that it will be more efficient or fair than the status quo. 
By focusing our attention on the role of property rights and institutional change, we are in a 
better position to determine the economic (dis)incentives which drove Georgia's upcountry citizens 
to argue bitterly over the fence law. Issues of efficiency, equity, fairness, and distribution of income 
fit naturally into any explanation of institutional change and provide us with a framework for 
analyzing the rich debate which clearly displays the economic concerns and desires of those 
involved. 
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The Fence Law Debate in 19th Century Upcountry Georgia
While the inhabitants of the nineteenth century Georgia upcountry were lamentably ignorant 
of neoclassical economic theory, the arguments that they offered during the fence law debate bear a 
striking resemblance to those of modem economic historians. Like recent theorists of property rights 
and institutional change, nineteenth century Georgians discussed possible gains in farming efficiency 
and resource conseivation, as well as the effects of these changes on the distribution of income under 
different institutional structures. 
Georgia law from colonial times until after the Civil War essentially stipulated that land that 
was not fenced in could be used as common pasture by everyone.24 Titis was not an English or 
"Celtic" inheritance, however.25 English common law did not require a man to fence in his land 
against another man's cattle. Rather, owners of animals were required to keep their stock on their 
own property, and, thus, animals that strayed onto a neighbor's enclosed or unenclosed land were 
considered trepassers.26 As English emigrants arrived in America to find vast amounts of
unimproved land and sparse settlements, it seemed desirable and economical to allow animals to 
roam the countryside freely. The eventual result of this new policy was to force landowners to erect 
and maintain adequate or "lawful" fences, or else to forego any chance for compensation for 
damages caused by another person's animals. In other words, "in every state of the Union, from the 
earliest times, it ha[d] been made compulsory for the landowner to maintain good fences for the 
protection of crops; to fence animals out, rather than to fence them in.'m Georgia's first fence Jaw, 
passed in 1759, explicitly required that: 
all fences or enclosures ... that shall be made around or about any garden, orchard, rice 
ground, indigo field, plantation or settlement in this province, shall be six feet high from 
the ground when staked or ridered and from the ground to the height of three feet of every 
such fence or enclosure, the rails thereof shall not be more than four inches distant from 
each other; and that all fences or enclosures that shall consist of paling shall likewise be 
six feet from the ground and the pales thereof not more than two inches asunder:
Provided always, that where any fence or enclosure shall be made with a ditch or trench, 
the same shall be four feet wide, and in that case the fence shall be six feet high from the 
bottom of the ditch. 28 
Those whose fences did not adhere precisely to the letter of the fence law were subject to 
treble damages if they killed or injured an animal straying upon ill-fenced land. In the 1881 
decision of Hamilton v. Howard, the Georgia Supreme Court declared that a lawful fence had to rise 
five feet from the ground everywhere, rather than merely averaging that height. 29 Furthermore, an 
1889 decision ruled that an agreement to dispense with a partition fence (one between two 
neighbors) was not the equivalent of a legal fence. Unless an actual fence were broken-not 
merely a cont.i""'act or agreement to dispense with a fence or an agreement to treat a dividing line as a 
fence- it was illegal for a farmer to harm a stray.30 The Court's message throughout was clear: a
legal fence was defined absolutely and no room for variations and exceptions existed. 
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The economic changes occuring in the postbellum era, however, gave many farmers reason 
to question the traditional practice of fencing in crops from animals. "I am compelled to build a 
lawful fence: or in other words a fence, 'horse-high, bull-strong and pig-tight,' to protect my own 
growing crop. Is that just? If this land belongs to me, has your stock any right to anything that 
grows upon it without my consent? That is my property. As a matter of justice, as a matter of policy, 
what right have you to the grasses that grow on the land of your neighbor? It is only permissive 
right, there is no legal or moral right in it. " Such was the emphatic and frustrated argument of "P," a 
Thompson's Mills resident in Jackson county, Georgia who finally pleaded with his fellow citizens, 
"'The stock law we must have, or we perish. "' For many stock law supporters in the postbellum 
period, the argument to fence in animals was very basic - each person should be entitled to use his 
own private property as he saw fit "Where does one man have a right to let his stock run over, and 
feed upon another's land?" asked a landless citizen of Carroll county in 1878 who went by the nom 
de plume, "L ". I.H.P. Beck, a landless farmer, schoolteacher, and devout Populist in the 1 890s, 
agreed: "A man's land is his own and one man's cow has no right to run on another's land inclosed 
or not. "31 
Drawing on familiar Jeffersonian rhetoric, reformers attacked fence laws as incompatible 
with "republican " independence. As "L " advised, "If you have stock, own a piece ofland to put 
them on, and keep them; not have them, and allow them to run over other's property. " [sic]32 Not 
only did stock law advocates claim that roving stock illegally violated their personal property rights, 
they also felt that their neighbor's had a moral obligation to respect these rights. Appealing to a 
widely shared individualistic natural rights tradition, J.O.R. Word proclaimed that "from a sense of 
justice between man and man, I think that every man should be compelled to take care of his own 
stock, that he has no moral right to turn loose his stock to prowl around upon his neighbor's crop:' 
illustrating the incongruity of common grazing rights within a more general system of wholly private 
property, proponents of the stock law posed homespun analogies: "A man has as much right to take 
his household and kitchen furniture and put it in another man's house and kitchen, as he does for his 
stock to run on his neighbor's enclosed or urtenclosed. " A Carroll Free Press reporter from Villa 
Rica described the logical result of a law which allowed a man to permit his stock to graze upon his 
neighbor's land. "Ifhe has this right, then by the same reasoning, he would be entitled to all the 
property not sheltered. A buggy or wagon left from under the shelter would be public property. "33 
While some renters, such as I.H.P. Beck, announced that "I am going to vote for 'no fence' 
because I think it will be to my interest to do so and every other renter, " others disagreed. Thus, an 
anonymous writer in Carroll county declared that "It is time now for the poor people to open their 
eyes and to come forward and stand up for their rights and not allow themselves to be led by the 
cunning land owners any longer and to come out and say we want a fence and turn out en masse and 
carry the election for fence . . . .  " Anti-stock law men appealed to traditional rights, just as the stock 
law proponents did. A. Nixon, an owner of a 125 acre farm in Carroll county, contended that "the 
citizens of this county have and always have had the iegal, moral and the Bibie right to iet their 
stock, unless of a dangerous character, run at large. " Like their opponents, fence law champions 
mixed practical with moral appeals. Many could not understand the logic of depriving their animals 
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of nature's abundant gifts. This was the argument of J.W. Pitts, alias "Buffalo Bill", of Carroll, " ... 
we have acorns, hickory-nuts, chesmuts and m[o]ss for hogs and in most parts we have a splendid 
range of grass. Wouldn't it be foolishness to shut our stock from it? Of course it would." Although 
Pitts believed that Carroll's natural resources were large enough to make the stock law unnecessary, 
he did not categorically dismiss the idea: "while they [trees] are all cut down and washed away in a 
great many places, Carroll boasts of plenty of timber, one thousand acres or more in one body, while 
the fields are small. It's the other way in those counties [that have adopted the stock law], and when 
Carroll gets in that condition, we'll give up for no fence, and not before." Similarly, W.D. Lovvorn 
of Bowdon, Georgia saw no reason for the stock law because "the woods are full of grass and acorns
part of the year. They were put here by our Creator for the benefit to his people, and I don't think it 
right to deprive a large majority to please a minority."34 
It was not only the threat of being "deprived" that frightened anti-stock law supporters, but 
also the belief that the poor man's loss was the rich landowner's gain. Many contemporaries viewed 
the struggle not as a cultural one, but as a simple material class conllict. John Stogner of Bowdon, 
for example, condemned the stock law as 
the greatest curse upon the poor laborer that has been since the civil war. We were told · 
in 1859 that secession was the greatest thing that the south could do, so it was to lead her 
into destruction. It was a rich mans war and a poor mans fight, so will the stock law be to
a few landlords who have plenty of water on their lands while nine tenths of the people 
will be in a deplorable condition. 
If the stock law passed, according to Stogner, "the common laborer will be the ones that will be the
sufferers ... and why should we try [to] oppress this class any worse. God makes the grass[,] the 
mountaines crown, and corn in valley grow, so lets not try to deprive our poor neighbors from 
receiving his blessing .... " A. Nixon lent a literary note to predictions of the law's effect: 
The stock law will divide the people of this county into classes similar to the patricians 
and plebians of ancient Rome, which unhappy division, was the source of much 
contention, injustice, violence and blood shed, and finally the overthrow of the republic, 
the kingdom and the empire, and brought on the dark ages of the world.35 
Or as one tenant farmer bluntly observed, "This [stock] law will simply take rights away from the
poor man and give them to the rich. "36 
Some stock law supporters lent credence to the class oppression charges of their critics. 
One, for instance, contended that "the non land holding class have no right to vote on this subject" 
Another asserted that "there should be a property qualification to every vote cast - own so much 
property to be allowed to vote ... It does seem sensible, dont you think, to allow the landholders to
say whether they shall fence their lands or not. " 37 Thomas P. Janes, the Georgia Commissioner of 
Agriculture, in his 1875 annual report made clear his position on the fence question: 
Even the present Act, which leaves the question of "fencing stock" or "fencing crops" to 
ihe voters of ihe several counties is unjust since it allows non-freeholders, who generally
consist a majority of the voters of every county, to decide a question of policy and 
economy in which they have no interest The most equitable way of disposing of the 
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question which, under the present labor system, is a vital one, is by legislative enactment 
leaving its decision to the freeholders of each county.38 
This conjunction of attacks on traditional political rights with those on traditional economic rights 
stimulated bitter responses condemning the stock law supporters as tyrants and oppressors of the 
poor and laboring class. "P.H.C.", a Democratic party leader from the Kansas district of Carroll 
county, who became a stock law supporter in 1882, earlier denounced "such a law to prohibit any 
one from voting [as] wickedness in the eye of the law and the eye of God." He further blasted those 
supporting disfranchisement, saying that, "such sentiments as these are tyranical and we are opposed 
to them from the fact that we live in an independent government by the people." Right-thinking 
elements of the population advocating white supremacy, however, made it clear that they did not 
oppose restricting black suffrage. "Mill Boy" explained that "If he [the stock proponent] can scratch
out that clause in the constitution that entitles them [blacks] to vote, I dont suppose that there are 
many Mill Boys that would cry about it. But sir, for God's sake dont disfranchise a white man, just 
because he is poor." 39 
But combat over political rights was usually subordinated to purely economic debates. 
Observing tangible losses in land, labor, capital, and natural resources, stock law supporters pressed 
their case with the utmost urgency. Nineteenth century southern farmers, for the most part, used 
"worm" fences to enclose their crops, and fences made of pale for their gardens and homesteads. 
Because the worm fence is constructed by laying the ends of rails on each other, a four foot strip on 
each side of the fence was wasted.40 Therefore, for every mile offence, approximately one acre of 
productive land was wasted. Those who were forced to expend extra land, labor, and capital under 
the fence law began to ask, "Why . . . should my land which I choose to tum out to improve by rest, 
be taken possession of and impoverished by other people's stock?"41 Although farmers conceded that 
the fence law was once an economical response to the antebellum geography and demography of an 
area, many began to feel the increasing burden of fencing in their crops. "School Boy" of Carroll 
county admitted that "when our fathers first settled in this country and our range was good and when 
the acreage in cultivation was [s]mall, the preSent system of fencing was proper ... " J.O.R. Word, a 
fellow Carrollite and stock law supporter, told a similar story about the stock law's erstwhile 
usefulness: "Forty nine years ag[o] father moved to this county. It was then a fine range for stock. 
I[t] was then the best economy to fence up our crops, for our farms were small and far between and 
range fresh and large." The Jefferson For est News tried to reason with its readers: "When the 
country was very sparsely settled, farms few and timber very abundant the present law was enacted, 
and like many law and customs, its has outlived its usefulness . . .  " In fact, the paper believed that 
"it is a sad evidence of old fogyism, general ignorance and backwardness of agriculture in the South 
that such a law as that now in force can exist." In a word, "reformers" believed that increases in 
population made the open range growingly inefficient for the society as a whole. "This is not a range 
country like it once was," as the ubiquitous correspondent "Ripples" put it.42 
As economic changes were taking place in the Georgia upcountry, many refonners argued
that the stock law was a first step in the South's movement away from relative poverty. In a 
Darwinian allusion, "Edgar" declared that "we must learn to give way to the fittest, for by doing so 
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we will keep prospering, and if not, we will never prosper." Jackson county's "P" was even more 
certain of the stock law's necessity. "I regard it [stock law] as the preliminary step to the prosperity 
of the agriculturalists of Jackson county." On the eve of the first fence election in Carroll county, 
"Ripples" chided his opponents, "Dont say the time is not yet come to begin to economize." While 
stock law advocates stressed progress, their opponents just as vaguely invoked tradition. Thus, 
Jackson county's "Fairplay" forthrightly sought to preserve the status quo, "Our present system of 
fencing is an old one - so old that it would seem cruel to attempt an innovation upon it "43 Another 
saw the fence law as an embodiment of "the liberty that our forefathers fought for. "44 "C. W.C" of 
Carroll county was simply at philosophical odds with his progressive stock law opponents, "He 
[I.H.P. Beck] says that he would rather jump into something new than to stand still and die in 
stagnation. There's where we differ, I would rather stagnate than to die in the stock law." Such 
statements made easy targets for "New South" rhetoric: "' . . .  By long usage our people are 
accustomed to the wagons, and why should we now try to supplant them by an engine? Whew! 
Supreme folly!' The fence law as we now have it was itself, at one age of the world, a new thing." 
Or, as another reformer chided, "Does improvement, progress and enterprise mean cruelty? Then 
Webster stands revised. "45 
While the stock law supporters may have hailed the law as a panacea for the economic woes 
of the South, they had difficulty convincing their contemporaries that the law would, in fact, increase 
their wealth. Their contention that the fence law unnecessarily wasted labor, land, and capital aimed 
to convert those who showed signs of "old fogyism, general ignorance and backwardness," in "an 
age of improvement" like that of the nineteenth century. "[T]he Southern farmer ha[d] not learned 
yet" economy.46 Stock law champions would teach him. 
Reformers in Jackson and Carroll counties claimed that the stock law would save farmers 
both labor and capital. "It [fence law J takes away most of the profit of farming to keep up good
fences," cried I.H.P. Beck. The Jefferson Forest News anticipated that "when farm stock is 
restrained, and the responsibility for their depredations is thrown on their owners, capital is released
from the very unprofitable investment of fencing, and made available for farm improvements." 
Combining both factors of production, "Plow Boy" suggested that " . . .  we should dispense with 
fences .. . because we could spend our time at something that would be much more renumerative than 
patching up fences such as making our manure heaps larger, stopping washes, etc., besides we would 
have no other stock to see after but our own." Likewise, Eugene F. Adair of Harmony Grove, 
Jackson county, asserted that, "While we used to split and haul rails, we could, under this 
arrangement [stock law], with the same labor, be making manure to improve the land intended to be 
cultivated. "41 
Other stock law advocates tried to make more precise calculations of the economic 
disadvantages of the status quo. Thus, "School Boy" claimed that "the fences of Carroll county are 
worth ihree times more than all the hogs, cows and sheep in the county, and I ... ask ... ii it is
economy for a man to have one dollar invested in a business and it takes three t[o] keep that one 
dollar up." After diligent computation, V ande Linctum found that "for every dollar invested in 
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livestock in the State, two dollars are required for construction of fences to protect the growing 
crops." "Hopeful" from Human's Store, Jackson county, "found out that it costs us twice as much to 
fence out stock as it does to pay our taxes, and besides we have had about enough of our crops 
destroyed by stock to pay our taxes .. . " In an anonymous Jackson county writer's derisive 
summary, the fence law advocate was like the "foolish boy who invested ten cents in a candle in 
order to look for [the] three cent piece he had dropped." In the face of such arguments, opponents 
could only bluster, as "Sandy Creek" of Jackson county did: "I don't call a man a farmer until he 
does keep his field fenced, and well at that .. .I think any man that is worthy of owning a farm ought 
to keep it fenced, and I don't consider him worthy of the name of a farmer unless he does. "48 
Even more often than they stressed labor saving, reformers prophesied that the stock law 
would improve the quality of livestock and, thus, yield better meat and dairy products. While 
fencing might reduce the number of livestock, the improved quality of the animal would more than 
compensate for the loss in number. "Ripples"' argument was typical: 
Tue milk and butter is free from poisons taken from cows that are kept up [i.e., fenced in] 
and then you know what your cattle eal But when they woods it, you don't know when 
you are drinking or eating deadly poisons. Butter made from cows kept up is much richer 
than from those cows that are allowed to run at large. There is as much difference as 
between gold and nickle silver. Tue beef is fatter, tenderer and better. Breed stock can 
be improved. One good cow well fed and pastured is worth 5 ticky woods cows. Two 
hogs kept up is worth ten razor backs running at large. 
Others asserted that Coweta county, which passed the stock law in 1881, was self-sufficient in meat, 
while Carroll was not. " .. . [H]ere are two counties [Coweta and Carroll], one self sustaining and 
the other not," "Plow Boy" wrote in the Free Press, "and yet some will tell you that you cant raise 
hogs in a stock law county." "Ripples," who lived in neighboring Coweta county but communicated 
through the Carroll newspapers, admitted that "we don't have quite so many hogs over here in 
Coweta as we used to have," before Coweta passed a stock law, but assured Carroll countians that 
Coweta hogs "are a heap bigger and fatter than they were."49 
As population expanded throughout the South, as blacks took advantage of their freedom to 
move, and as the growth of the railroad networic made it possible to market crops from previously 
isolated areas, population density increased in the Georgia upcountry. Table 1 shows the percentage 
change in population by race, broken down into the six conventional regions of Georgia from 1850 
to 1890. Between 1870 and 1880 the Upcountry, Wiregrass, and Pine Barrens regions were leading 
the state with percentage increases between twenty-four and thirty-six percent for whites and 
between thirty-four and thirty-nine percent for blacks. Even though it grew less rapidly in the 1880s 
than did the Wiregrass and Pine Barrens regions, the Upcountry population was still increasing at a 
faster pace than either the Plantation Belt or the Mountain regions. Tue Table also shows the 
percentage increase for Carroll and Jackson counties. Carroll's population growth was rather 
asto�11ding, '.Vit.11 t.11.e black population growi.-ig, on average, fi...41'1�five percent per decade a...-id 177 
percent from 1870 to 1 890. The white population growth was also relatively healthy, with an 
average increase of twenty-seven percent per decade and seventy-six percent over the two decades. 
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Jackson county's black population growth was more modest with an 1870 to 1890 total of forty-five 
percent, while the white sector grew eighty-four percent over the two decades. 
(Table I about here) 
To stock law supponers, the increasing pressure on the land required that it be used more 
efficiently. If animals were forced to be fenced in, improved acreage could be expanded. The 
reformers saw two sources of unimproved land that could be brought into cultivation - the wasted 
land used as fence rows and patches of fertile land too small to justify the expenditure for a 
surrounding fence. Speaking from his stock law experience in Coweta, J.P. Reese (alias "Ripples") 
contended that "the old fence rows of Carroll county will make corn enough in three years to pay for
all the crops that will grow in the county for the next ten years. I mean the wood grasses." 
Similarly, Jackson county's Adair predicted that "if there was a law compelling owners of stock to
keep them under a fence, we could clean and plant just such pieces of land as we thought best. 
Leaving out the poorest, we could plant where we pleased, no matter how small, or in what shape it 
might be." 50 
Yet population growth is hardly a necessary condition and may not be even a sufficient 
condition for institutional change. What about relative price changes and a changing market 
environment as an impetus for doing away with the fence law? Let us suppose that farmers 
produced two commodities, crops and animals. If the relative price of crops to animals increased, 
the farmer would shift away from producing animals and increase his crop acreage. As a consumer, 
on the other hand, he would tend to eat relatively more meat and less corn and other grains. As a 
consequence, this hypothesized relative price change would make the stock law more attractive to a 
farmer having access to inter-regional trade, ceteris paribus. Figure 3 plots the relative price of com 
to bacon sides and of cotton to bacon sides in Georgia from 1870 to 1890, inclusive. As regressions 
based on this Figure show, the relative price of corn and cotton rose during this two decade span, but 
at a statistically insignificant rate. 51 And while contemporary debaters did not explicitly refer to such
complex and subtle economic trends, the discussion did reflect an awareness of the basic facts. As
the editor of the Jackson Herald observed, "It stands to reason that in an agricultural country stock is 
not of such great importance as the crops, hence they should be confined. If this was a stock county
the crops, which would be small and insignificant, ought to be fenced." In sum, "the whole subject is 
one that can be reduced to dollars and cents." 52 
(Figure 3 about here) 
The marlcet environment in the upcountry was changing dramatically as recovery from the 
Civil War progressed. Since many rivers were not yet navigable and wagon transponation to the 
nearest major trading centers, such as Atlanta and Augusta, was very expensive, railroads became the 
essential driving force behind the economic growth of many counties in the Georgia hills. Although 
tt1e first rail company tl1at proposed a line in Carroll county was chartered in i852, the Savannah, 
Griffin, and Nonh Alabama Railroad Company (SG&NA) did not have a track in Carroll ready for 
use until 1873. Because of natural obstacles, the SG&NA did not reach Carrollton, Carroll's largest 
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town, until 1874. By 1888 the Chattanooga, Rome, and Columbus Railroad had only a short section
in Floyd county to finish before connecting Carrollton and Chattanooga. As an example of the
railroad's success, consider the following: In 1890 passengers travelling to Atlanta (about 45 miles 
away) could leave Carrollton at 5:00 a.m., spend the day in the city, and then return to Carrollton by 
8:00 p.m. Elsewhere in the county, the Georgia Pacific Railroad, which completed work in 1882, 
connected Villa Rica, Carroll's second largest town, to central Alabama.53 
Jackson county, on the other hand, was still without its own rail connection in 1880. 
However, since 1876 residents on the eastern border of the county were able to use the Northeastern 
Railroad of Georgia (NRG), which connected them to wider markets via Athens, Georgia. In the 
early-1880s, however, the Gainesville, Jefferson, and Southern Railroad (GJ&S) began to stir public 
emotion in order to attract local stockholders so that a road could be built into Jefferson, Jackson's 
county seat. John W. Glenn, spokesman for the railroad company, explained to Jackson county's 
farmers that their county was rich in natural resources which could easily "bring an astonishing 
income, " if only they could get their produce to market. Glenn foresaw land values near the route 
"doubl[ing] and quadrupl[ing], " capital flowing freely into the county, and a population increase 
which would result in a great competition for land. Glenn emphasized that "we can never be a ·great 
agricultural district without quick and cheap transportation. "54 In 1884 the GJ&S began operation 
and connected Jackson's largest town to major trading centers of Georgia.55 Having close 
communications with such major trade cities as Atlanta, Augusta, Chattanooga, and Montgomery 
greatly expanded the economic opportunities of upcountry farmers. In fact, James C. Bonner, in his
history of Carroll county, explains that "the railroads did more to quicken the economic tempo of 
Carroll County than any other event during [the nineteenth] century."56 
The emergence of the railroad had three very important effects on the upcountry economy. 
First, relatively inexpensive transportation enabled farmers to import a technology, namely guano 
(contemporaries seem to have called any commercial fertilizer "guano "), which tremendously 
increased cotton yields per acre. Second, the railroad provided an efficient method for sending the 
county's fertilizer-stimulated surplus to major marketing centers.57 Together, these explosions in
productivity induced a third change, an increased demand for cultivated acreage, which, in tum, 
raised the stakes of the controversy over the fence laws. 
The reformers' concern for the future was reflected also in their emphasis on resource 
conservation. Present over-exploitation of forests to build extensive networks of fences robbed 
future generations and threatened to denude the areas of timber. As J.O.R. Word insisted, " . .. this 
is a question of vast importance not only to the present, but to the future generation." "I speak in 
behalf of saving the timber for the benefit of the future generation .. .. " V ande Linctum claimed 
that "the repair of fences annually calls for the destruction of nearly 100, 000 acres of timber, which, 
when taken in connection with other depletions of forest in the next half century, will leave the entire 
country destitute of timber. " Moreover, since railroads both used wood for ties and made it possible 
to sell timber in a larger marketplace, the expansion of the rail network made lumber more valuable 
than it had been when the upcountry was isolated and self-sufficient. As "Ripples" remarked, "If I
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owned the timber of Carroll county I would not want any bigger fortune. The way to save your 
timber is adopt the stock law."58 Although the Georgia General Assembly of 1879 allowed barbed 
wire to be classed a legal fence, the wire was relatively expensive, and reformers believed, probably 
correctly, that upcountry farmers would continue to build more wooden fences for some time.59 
A Theory of Stock Law Voting 
Advocates of fence reform realized "that people [would] vote for what they suppose to be 
personal interest in the matter."60 Although they did not use the phrase, stock law proponents 
understood the concept of a Pareto improvement, and they freely admitted that their reform would 
not make everyone better off. "School Boy", for example, stated, "I will admit that there are a few 
men that it [stock law] will not suit - though I think it will benefit twenty-five where it will injure 
one." In similar fashion, J.O.R. Word reasoned, "Admitting that the no fence law would worlc a 
hardship against a few, would it not be the part of wisdom to legislate for the best good of many[?]" 
Finally, "Summuloc" of Jackson county succinctly summarized his argument for the stock law, "We 
need not hope to please everybody, for that is impossible. Our object should be to promote the 
general good, and our motto, 'Pro Bono Publico . "' 61 In fact, with majority rule, they realized that 
the proposed law did not need to benefit everyone. 
As pointed out above, some historians of the fence debate have grouped the contending 
parties in the debate into laborers and tenants of both races, along with "very small farmers, the 
poorer end of the landowning class," on one side, and richer white landowners, on the other. 62 Or, as 
Hahn puts it, "the mass of Upcountry yeomen, tenants, and laborers," fought against "landlords, 
merchants, and business interests throughout the state."65 However, if we assume that voters cast 
their ballots for the stock or fence law so as to maximize their expected utilities, and if we assume a 
competitive marlcet for labor64, economic theory offers quite different predictions of who supported 
the stock law and of their reasons for doing s0. 65 
Let us first consider landowners. Quite simply, if the stock law passed and a landowner 
expected to be a net loser, he or she would experience the full effect of the loss, ceteris paribus. 
Clearly, as Flynn and Hahn suggest, yeomen farmers who relied on the open range to feed their 
animals would have been solidly against any redefinition of property rights. Alternatively, the 
wealthier landowners who could afford to provide pasturage for their animals and who expected to 
profit from the stock law, would have been the champions of reform. 
Tenants (either sharecroppers or cash renters),66 contrary to the claims of Flynn and Hahn, 
cannot be so easily placed in the fence law camp on the basis of theory. Imagine a landowner and 
tenant signing a contract stipulating that the tenant had to provide for his animals, but not furnishing 
pasturage on the landowner's farm. In the rental contract between James Willbanks and C.M. Wood, 
a landlord from Harmony Grove, Jackson county, for example, the subject of pasturage was made 
quite explicit. Not only was Willbanks "to take care of said farm as it was his own," but it was stated 
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also that "there is to be noe pastureing on the land of said place that are in cultivation."67 If the rental 
contract forbade pasturing on cultivated acreage, and provided no pasture or unimproved land for 
animals to forage,68 a tenant then had two options: he could pen his animals and feed them 
purchased grain or fodder grown on his own small farm, or he could send his animals out into the 
forest to find food for themselves. Whether a tenant signed such an agreement or he received pasture 
as part of the contract, the implicit wage each of these tenants expected to receive must have been 
equal, holding everything else constant, if the market for labor was competitive. 69 
If the stock law were adopted, competition for tenants should have compelled the landowner 
to compensate any tenant whose animals had previously been dependent on the open range by giving 
him pasture, by taking a smaller share of the crop, or by reducing the cash rent In the end, however, 
the tenant's implicit wage would remain the same. As a class, tenants should have been indifferent 
between the stock and fence laws. A similar argument would equate the before and after implicit 
wages of the small percentage ( 6. 1 % ) of the tenants in Jackson and Carroll counties who owned no 
animals. 
Contemporary stock law advocates understood these arguments well. Jackson county's 
"Progress" contended that the stock law would make both landowners and their tenants better off. 
"The income of tenants and wages of hirelings will be regulated by the profits of the land owners . . .
. Renters now demand houses for their families, and why not demand, under the new law, pasturage 
for their stock with the same propriety? This they will do and receive it at far less cost to the owner 
than is required to repair fences." Similarly, the Forest News editorialized: 
It is currently reported that the great majority of the colored people in this county are 
opposed to it [stock law] upon the idea that most of them are tenants, and that if the stock 
law is passed they cannot keep any stock on their own account .. .It is pure fallacy to say 
that the laborer or tenant, or, as the demagogues have it, the poor man, will suffer by it. 
The man who will have the burden to bear will be the man who owns the land. He will 
be compelled to furnish pasturage for his tenants or not get them, and it is impossible for 
him to do without help. 
Richard Baldwin, a black Morgan county resident, speaking in Monroe, Walton county, admitted 
that he had been opposed to the stock law at first, but upon seeing how the stock law operated in his 
home county, soon changed his mind and averred that all other blacks had also. Baldwin affirmed 
that "I know of no man in Morgan county who charges his tenants for pastures. If there was such a 
man the darkeys wouldn't live with him to save his life." "Tenant" had the same faith in the stock 
law, believing it to be in " . . .  the interest of the tenant fully as much or more than the land-holder, 
from the fact that whoever furnishes the best pastures will certainly get the best tenants, as it is all 
bosh about the land-holder being more independent than the tenant, for what is his land worth to him 
without labor?" In Rockdale county, which was one of the first to pass the stock law, the editor of 
the county newspaper observed that "landlords see who can arrange the best pastures to secure the 
best te11a.11ts.1170 Assuming U.f!a..nl.rnous support for the fence law among te11a..l'lts ignores wtu:1t 
contemporaries said, as well as the logic of the competitive market 
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Wage laborers may also have found the stock law in their interest. At least in the short run, 
the demand for labor might increase under the stock law because farmers would be able to remove 
the fences surrounding their crops and, hence, could expand their acreage by cultivating former fence 
rows and small patches of fertile ground. Labor would not only be needed to remove the fences, but 
also to build them around pastures so as to enclose any previously non-pastured animals. Since the 
short run supply oflabor was presumably inelastic, the wages of laborers could be expected to rise. 
It might be argued that the increased labor demand would be offset because farmers were 
most likely over-investing in animals and with the stock law, herd sizes (of non-draft animals) 
would be reduced, causing a decreased need for people to look after animals. Since farmers reported 
their 1879 expenditure on labor services for the 1880 Census, we are able to estimate which factors 
influenced a farmer's use of wage labor. Regression analysis of those farms using wage labor shows 
that milk cows and swine, the animals most likely to be allowed to roam the open range, were not 
significant determinants of the wage bill (See Table 2).71 Nor was butter production a significant 
user of labor services. Therefore, we can conclude that for those farms using wage laborers, the 
labor was allocated to raising cotton and grains and to tending to draft animals. Thus, we can reject 
the notion that the stock law would decrease the need for labor because cow and swine herd sizes 
would be reduced. 
(Table 2 about here) 
Table 3 shows the occupations of black and white household heads in Carroll and Jackson 
counties. Tenants and laborers of both races made up substantial portions of the voting population in 
both counties as they comprised, respectively, 43.9 and 46.9 of the white and 91.7 and 93.1 of the 
black household heads. It is interesting to note that 72.4 and 57 .6 of the white farm owners in 
Carroll and Jackson, respectively, were operating farms with less than fifty acres of tilled land. If 
men voted as both Flynn and Hahn predict, a priori, it would appear that the stock law supporters 
had no chance for success. Their hope, which was certainly expressed in the contemporary 
newspapers, was to sway the pivotal coalition of tenants and laborers of both races to the stock law 
side. 
(Table 3 about here) 
The theoretical model of the fence struggle that we propose differs significantly from the one 
contained in the historical literature. Instead of a class conflict between relatively wealthy 
landowners and a coalition of yeomen farmers, tenants, and wage laborers, we contend that tenants 
and laborers had few reasons to be strong advocates of the fence Jaw. In fact, theoretically, they 
should have expected to profit from the stock law. 
The Changing Pattern of Voting on the Stock Law 
Voting returns from militia districts in Carroll and Jackson counties translated the attitudes 
expressed in the fence debate into actual behavior. From 1881 to 1890, Carroll county held five 
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countywide elections - in January, 1 882; September, 1882; July, 1885; July. 1887; and July, 1890. 
Jackson county held two countywide elections, one in July, 1881,  and another in September, 1883. 
In addition, many of the militia districts held local-option elections, which were sporadically and 
incompletely reported in the newspapers. We therefore focus primarily on the returns from the 
countywide referenda, which we repon in Tables 4 and 5.
Although the fence side consistently attracted a majority of those casting ballots in both 
counties, there are two imponant trends in the data, only the first of which has been stressed by 
previous historians. The fence law progressively lost suppon throughout the 1 880s. As the time
series of turnout figures demonstrates;·howeverdhis decline was overshadowed by the dramatic 
decrease in participation on both sides of the issue. The much more numerous elections in Carroll 
show the rise and fall of the fence debate's fury most clearly. An increase in voter turnout by almost 
seventeen percent between January and September, 1882 is cenainly an indication of the intense 
competition between the fence and stock law factions. As the editor of the Carroll County Times 
remarked after the second ballot in his county: "No election for a long time has excited more
interest than the election last Saturday on the fence question. Exciting the interest it did, of course, 
there was a full vote polled - larger, we believe, than any we have had in a long time. "72 By 1885
the intensity on both sides began to wane, as almost twenty percent fewer eligible voters cast ballots, 
with the stock law making marginal gains as a result of the diminished interest 
(Tables 4 and 5 about here) 
Although proponents of the stock law were able to increase their relative share of the
electorate over time, their base of suppon, at least in Carroll, was quite unstable. Table 6 displays 
the transition matrices between the first and second elections in Carroll and Jackson counties, and 
between the second and third election in Carroll. The tranSition matrices contain estimates of the 
probability that voters who supponed one side in one election continued supporting that position, 
switched to the other side, or abstained from voting in a subsequent contest Because some estimates 
calculated by ordinary least squares fell outside the logical 0-100 percent bounds, we have estimated 
the equations underlying these tables in logit fonn.73 While an estimated 92.0 percent of the fence 
law voters in Carroll's first election voted for the status quo again in election two, only 67.1 percent 
of the stock law voters continued their suppon to the second election. Moreover, of those who voted 
for the stock law in election one, 29.3 percent of them simply did not vote the second time. This is 
surprising, since the interval between the two elections was only eight months, and since overall 
turnout rose by 17 percent from the first to the second contest. It is interesting to note that almost 29 
percent of the non-voters in the first election supponed the fence law in election two, while about 20 
percent of the newly mobilized cast their franchises for the stock law position. 
(Table 6 about here) 
Surpri_singly, Panel B, which summarizes the transition from election two to three, shows an
even greater pattern of volatility, especially on the stock law side. Of those who voted for the new 
institution in election two, only half remained faithful through the next election. and almost half 
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abstained. Stock law proponents attracted 59 percent of the non-voters of election two; otherwise, 
the stock law's showing in the third election would certainly have been even more meager. 
Conversely, the fence law faction was able to maintain approximately three-fourths of its support 
over this period, with most of the remainder abstaining in the later election. In sum, Carroll county's 
stock law coalition did not vote with the vigor that we would expect from "landlords, merchants, and 
business interests," and, contrary to Hahn's claim, stock law opponents were apparently able to 
"develop an organizational apparatus to mobilize their ranks and inspire confidence in their 
numerical strength. "74 
Panel C of Table 6 shows that Jackson county's stock law coalition was extremely cohesive 
between 1881 and 1883. The fence law retained two-thirds of its backers over the same period, and 
gained about 28 percent of those who had abstained at first Although the stock law was able to hold 
its support in Jackson county through 1882, the basic fact is that the law's proponents were 
continuously overpowered by the fence law advocates' numerical strength. Carroll county's stock 
law men, by contrast, were too few and too fickle to prevail at the county level. 
Frustrated by their repeated countywide defeats, stock law supporters began to concentrate 
their attention on adopting the law at the militia district level. By the 1887 countywide election in 
Carroll, eight of the fifteen districts had adopted the stock law in district referenda. In four of these 
eight districts, however, the fence law had originally been declared the victor, but after being 
contested on the ground of ballot fraud, the county ordinary (judge) overturned the results and 
declared the districts stock law areas. The precise wording of the law, no doubt, created confusion 
among voters as the county election ballots were required to read either "fence" or "no fence," the 
latter meaning the stock law. The district election ballots, on the other hand, had to be either "for 
fence" or for the "stock law." The election in Carroll's Bowdon district was particulary "muddled" as 
the precinct managers certified the result in favor of the fence law 102 to 73. However, the actual 
vote cast was 73 for "stock law," 68 "for fence," 30 for "fence," 2 for "a fence," and 2 for "the fence." 
The county ordinary, after hearing arguments from both sides, threw out the 34 votes not cast "for 
fence," thus leaving a majority for the "stock law. "75 In the remaining four districts, however, the 
stock law won comfortable majorities. 76 Therefore, by taking advantage of legal changes and 
ambiguities and by concentrating their attention on the much smaller districts, stock law supporters 
were able to close the open range of Carroll and Jackson counties little by little. 
Since more than half of Carroll county's districts were already under the stock law rule, it is 
not surprising that only about half of the eligible voters cast ballots in the 1887 county election. 
Within the next three years, five more districts imposed the stock law, and turnout in that year's
contest plummeted to 19 percent, the decrease being most dramatic in the stock law districts. 77 
Figure 4 shows Carroll county's voter turnout and election results for three types of districts, labelled 
A, B, and C, respectively: those that adopted the stock law by the 1887 countywide election, those 
that adopted after the 1887 eiection, but before the 1 890 contest, and, finally, those districts that 
never adopted the law until after 1 890. The graphs in Figure 4 track voter activity from 1885 to 
1 890, including the district referendum in which the stock law prevailed (if relevant). What is
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apparent from Panel A of Figure 4 is that once districts adopted the stock law, many voters 
apparently felt that the costs of casting a ballot for either option were too high to justify a trip to the 
polls.18 
While Group A districts sent about sixty percent of their eligible voters to the polls in 1885 
and in the local referenda, after these districts adopted the stock law turnout fell to 41.6 percent in 
1887 and to a low of 12.9 percent in 1890. Group B districts followed the same general pattern 
described above, with turnout near sixty-five percent in 1885, 1887, and in their district elections, 
but only 23.8 percent in the 1890 countywide ballot. It is important to note that in regions where the 
open range continued to be argued actively, voters continued to go to the polls in large numbers. 
Group C districts, those that retained the open range through the 1890 election, sent 59 percent of 
their voters to the polls in the last election, whereas their stock law countei:parts sent only 12.9 to 
23.8 percent of theirs. And as Panel B of the Figure shows, these districts voted faithfully for the 
fence law throughout the election process. 
(Figure 4 about here) 
Tables 4 through 6 and Figure 4 cloud Hahn's image of helpless partisans of common rights 
overwhelmed by a juggernaut of merchants and rich farmers who represented the impersonal free 
market.79 Fence law partisans won all seven countywide elections in the two counties from 1881 to 
1890; and their pattern of support was, on the whole, much less volatile than that of their opponents. 
Even more serious for Hahn's thesis, after adopting their preferred arrangement in their own 
districts, most stock law supporters abstained in subsequent countywide referenda, rather than 
seeking to impose their views on open range areas. Contemporaries explicitly recognized this 
practice. A correspondent of the pro-stock law Carroll Free Press thought it "wrong for the county 
to pass on the question as to whether they should have the stock law in his district as the policy has 
been heretofore to let the districts act upon this matter for themselves. We agree with the Squire, let 
each district worlc out its own salvation, but dont force it on a district whether they are willing or 
not"80 
On the same day in 1890 that Carroll county stock law supporters abstained in droves, the 
same voters decided another issue in a local referendum. The object of bitter contention for years, 
the proposal to issue bonds to erect a new county courthouse attracted 1432 ballots in districts that 
had adopted the stock law, while only 650 of the same voters who had already assumed the cost of 
going to the polls in the two issue election bothered to express their opinions on the fence question. 81
This special "allegiance to local control"82 displayed in the 1890 election is a clear indication that 
fence refmmers were not engaged in any sweeping plan to restructure the social or cultural basis of 
their economy. Their goal, instead, was to restructure property rights in specific geographic areas 
where economic efficiencies could be captured through a redefinition of the tort liability regarding 
a..nlma!s a..11d fences. 
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Who Favored the Stock Law? 
The time-series analysis of the voting presented above, while uncovering the changing 
mood and incentives of the voters on each side of the struggle, ignores the underlying reasons voters 
aligned with either side. Did men vote for the fence law as a means of voicing their objections to the 
encroaching capitalist market, as Hahn contends? Was the fence law conflict, as both Flynn and 
Hahn assert, a manifestation of the class distinctions of this agricultural society? Or do the voting 
patterns suggest a more complex pattern of divisions, as the individual utility maximization model 
outlined in the previous section implies? In particular, which side did blacks and white tenant 
farmers support? Since, as Table 3 shows, more than eight out of ten black household heads in 
Jackson county were unskilled laborers, not tenants, in our regression analysis of the voting returns 
we enter both the percentage of tenants and the percentage black in each district as independent 
variables. 
To test for the possibility that fence law voters cast their ballots to demonstrate their 
opposition to the encroachment of capitalist markets, we use two variables: per capita cotton 
production and the percentage of farms achieving self-sufficiency in grain. 83 Since cotton was 
unequivocally a cash crop, growing it plainly involved farmers in the international market. 
Furthermore, relatively more self-sufficient farms within a district meant that less reliance on the 
wider market, and, if Hahn is correct, a higher likelihood that the district would oppose a law that 
symbolized the intrusion of outside economic forces. 
With the rich data that we have collected from the manuscript census returns for individual 
farms, we are able to estimate whether a farm expected to benefit or lose if the stock law had been 
instantaneously put into force in 1880. The details of the calculation are discussed in Appendix A. 
For the regression analysis, we calculated the percentage of farms in each district that would have 
received a positive net return from the stock law's adoption. As the percentage of farms that could 
be expected to profit increased, a self-interest model would predict that a higher percentage of voters 
would support the stock law, ceteris paribus. 
We also included variables that tapped the percentage of the district's acreage that was 
wooded, per capita wealth, and population density. A higher proponion of woodlands meant easier 
foraging for animals and cheaper wood for fences, and, consequently, less support for the stock law. 
The higher the population per square mile, the greater the likelihood that one person's roaming 
animals would destroy another's crops, or, in small towns, another's garden plots. Recognizing the 
special circumstances of such hamlets, the General Assembly gave many incorporated town councils 
the right to pass local ordinances forbidding animals from running at large. 84 The town of Carrollton 
passed her own local ordinance in March, 1886, making it unlawful for animals to be allowed 
"willfuly or negligently" to run at large within the corporate limits of the town. 8' Thus, higher 
population density should correlate with greater support for the stock law. 
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White pe r  capita wealth is included among the independent variables to test how material 
wealth affected voting behavior across districts. 86 The Hahn and Flynn contention is that the "poor," 
as a class, voted to keep the open range, while the "rich" fought for the enforcement of private 
property rights. If this hypothesis is correct, per capita wealth should be negatively correlated with 
the fence law vote and the opposite for the stock law. 
As shown above, the adoption of the stock law at the militia district level markedly changed 
the behavior of voters in subsequent countywide elections. Therefore, in order to control for the 
effect of a district's adoption of the stock law, we created a variable interacting a dummy variable 
for the 1887 Carroll election and a dummy taking the value of 1 ifthe district had already passed the 
stock law by the time of the 1887 general countywide election, and 0 otherwise. A similar 
interaction variable captures how those districts that adopted the stock law by 1890 behaved in the 
last Carroll referendum. As our discussion above implies, the fact that a district had already closed 
the range should have had a negative effect on both stock law and fence law voting, and a positive 
effect on voter abstention. These effects should be more pronounced for the 1890 election. 
Before proceeding to the multivariate statistical analysis, we present in Table 7 the matrix of 
bivariate correlation coefficients between our dependent and independent variables. The dependent 
variables of the analysis are the percentage of the eligible voters voting for the fence law, the stock 
law, or not voting at all. The agricultural data used as independent variables was aggregated from 
the manuscript agricultural schedules of the 1880 census up to the militia district level, using a 100
percent sample of farms within both counties. Population figures, however, were obtained from 
published census documents, while information on wealth and eligible voters was found in the 
counties' original property tax digests. 
The data tentatively supports our model predicting self-interested behavior. The variables 
describing the economic environment agents faced, such as amount of forest available, population 
density, and expected profitability of the stock law separately seem to explain the voting trends well. 
Our hypothesis that tenants and laborers had little reason to favor the fence law is supported, more 
dramatically for black than for white voters. As the Table shows, neither cotton production nor 
self-sufficiency in grain significantly affected voting behavior. The Bonner and Hahn observation 
that wealth was a significant factor in a district's voting calculus is substantiated, but what must be 
noted is wealth's strong correlation with many other variables that also affected voting behavior. 
Therefore, in order to create a clear, more complete picture of the voting dynamics, we must 
abandon Bonner and Hahn's use of bivariate analysis for a more rigorous test of the contending 
hypotheses surrounding the fence debate. 
(Table 7 about here) 
Ordinary least squares estimates of the three share equations are reported in Table 8.87 The 
two variables directly testing Hahn's "rebellion" thesis, self-sufficiency in grain and per capita 
cotton production, are insignificantly different from zero in all three equations. In other words, the 
hypothesis that fence law supporters were men protesting their involvement in the capitalist 
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economy and communicating their desire for a return to a "moral economy," is rejected by the data. 
(Table 8 about here) 
The elections returns support the competitive model's prediction that tenants' wages would 
be equal under the fence and stock law regimes and that these farmers would vote accordingly. 
None of the coefficients is significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level, suggesting that tenants 
were indifferent between the two laws. If anything - contrary to Flynn's and Hahn's views ­
tenants were more favorable to the stock law than to the fence law standard. 88 Nor are laborers 
disproportionately represented in the fence law coalition, as Hahn asserted. As a district's black 
population increased, the percentage voting for the fence law decreased. Rather than support either 
side, blacks seem to have abstained. 89 This result refutes the hypothesis that laborers would vote for 
the stock law upon realizing that their wages might increase in the short term after the institutional 
change. However, black voter abstention did not significantly reduce the stock law's support, which 
suggests that laborers were not vehemently against the fencing-in of animals. 
The variables tapping the economic incentives facing voters, for the most part, operate as 
expected. The percent forest coefficient is of the right sign in the first two equations, but never 
significant at conventional levels. Furthermore, population density affected voting in the expected 
direction, but is never significant. Our variable estimating the percentage of farms expecting to 
benefit from the stock law seems to be an accurate description of the relative benefits anticipated 
from the stock law. Particularly important in a voter's decision calculus was whether or not his 
income would rise or fall after the stock law's adoption. As the regressions clearly display, voters 
seem to have been well aware of the monetary implications of changing the fence law and to have 
sided with the option that promised to maximize their net benefits over time. 
White per capita wealth was strongly and positively correlated with a district's voting for the 
stock law. In order for the Flynn/Hahn hypothesis that class distinctions divided the stock law and 
fence law coalitions to be accepted, we wowd expect increased wealth to have positively influenced 
the stock law voting and negatively affected fence law voting. However, this pattern is not observed 
in the data. While the coefficient for wealth in the stock law equation is positive and highly 
significant, it is insignificantly different from zero in the fence equation. This implies that fence 
voters were not motivated by the class distinctions of their society when choosing to support the 
open range. Even though we control for effects such as the use of tenant farmers, population density, 
and expected profit from the stock law, which all correlate positively with per capita wealth. the 
wealth coefficient is still quite significant. It is likely that some of the economic benefits accruing to 
the relatively wealthy town districts are not captured by our measure of expected benefits to farms. 
The olfactory benefits of banning marauding cows and pigs from small towns, as well as the more 
tangible ones of keeping them out of one's garden are as difficult to compute a century later as they 
were to ignore in the 1880s. 
Finally, the coefficients of the dummy variables proxying the behavioral change of 
individual districts that adopted the stock law at the sub--rounty level by the 1887 and 1890 Carroll 
23 
elections have the expected signs. The fence law was the hardest hit once individual districts no 
longer had a stake in the countywide election process. The status quo lost 20.4 percent of its 
electoral support in 1887 and an additional 12 percent by the 1890 poll, holding all else constant 
While the stock law's supporters continued to vote for their choice in 1887, by 1 890 the new 
institution lost almost eight percent of the electorate. Since the stock law supporters were 
outnumbered by their opponents between two and three to one before 1887, the dropoff in turnout 
hurt them nearly as much as it did the fence partisans, who easily carried all seven elections in both 
counties.90 
A Conflict of Cultures or a Conflict of Interests? 
The fence law question was of considerable concern to many Southern farmers and, hence, 
received much attention in the postbellum South. A thorough investigation of the arguments put 
forward by participants of the debate shows that contemporaries were well aware of the economic 
benefits and problems associated with the stock law. They understood the economic consequences 
of their actions and addressed issues familiar to neoclassical economic historians, such as private 
property rights, the redistribution of income, Pareto optimality, and fairness. 
Recently, historians have addressed the fence debate, portraying it primarily as a conflict 
between the rich and the poor, the "haves" and the "have-nots." Clearly, this explanation is too 
simple. Both qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that the fence issue was more than a 
struggle between the landed and the landless - it represented an opportunity for at least some 
members of these two groups to forge a political coalition in order to capture the economic 
advantages of a new, more efficient institution. 
A simple two-class conflict model fits the data from Carroll and Jackson counties poorly 
because group interests did not divide neatly into two parts. As our theoretical model based on 
expected utility maximization predicted, tenants and laborers were indifferent between the fence law 
and the stock Jaw. The relationship between voting patterns and variables designed to reflect the 
economic incentives facing voters, such as unimproved or forest acreage and the percentage of farms 
expecting to profit from the Jaw imply that farmers were lined up according to the divergent 
economic interests of the areas in which they resided. The insignificant effect of per capita wealth 
on fence Jaw support, ceteris paribus, also weighs heavily against a simple class interpretation. Nor 
does Hahn's contention that fence voters cast their ballots in rebellion against the "values of the free 
market" gain support from our more comprehensive analysis. Neither market integration nor market 
isolation played a significant role in a district's decision to vote for the stock Jaw or fence law. 
This brings us back to the start of our paper: are the views of economists and historians who 
explain the process of institutional change as a calculated attempt to capture economic efficiencies at 
odds with those who couch their explanations of political and economic struggies, such as the fence 
debate, in terms of a predetermined conflict between classes? As our analysis shows, the stock Jaw 
clearly created an opportunity for progressive farmers to capture the efficiency gains from enclosing 
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animals. The benefits, however, did not accrue to wealthy farmers alone - the expected 
profitability was spread across class lines, as tenants and laborers might have expected to benefit 
from the stock law as well. 
The more serious front on which debaters of the fence issue fought concerned the 
distribution of costs and benefits. Small farm owners who relied on the open range as a food source 
certainly had no desire to keep their animals penned up, for that meant reducing their herd sizes, 
shifting cultivated acreage out of crop production and into pasturage for the remaining animals, and 
taking land out of cotton production in order to feed their livestock. These farmers, who made up a 
large percentage of the populations of Carroll and Jackson counties, seem to have been motivated by 
the same force that drove their stock law counterparts, the desire to preserve or expand their 
economic stature. Both qualitative and quantitative evidence drawn from the same counties as Hahn 
and Bonner studied convinces us that the bitter conflict over the fence law had its roots not in a 
struggle to preserve a cooperative "moral economy," but in the straightforwardly materialistic goals 
shared in common by those who expected to win and those who expected to lose by this institutional 
change. It was a conflict not of cultures or classes, but of interests. 
APPENDIX A 
Procedure Used to Calculate Expected Savings from Stock Law 
Given the very detailed agricultural data of the manuscipt schedules, we are able to approximate the 
expected gain or loss from the stock law accruing to individual farms. The variable we use in our 
regression analysis, however, is the percentage off all faims expecting a non-negative net return. 
Below we detail the procedure used to compute the expected (dis)savings. 
1.) Wasted Land 
Contemporaries believed that the largest potential source of savings from the stock 
law could be achieved by literally breaking down the fences and bringing into production that 
land previously occupied by fence rows. They argued that between 1.0 and 3.4 percent of the 
land behind fences was consumed by fence rows.91 We will assume that 1.0 percent of the 
land was wasted for our computation. 
2.) Crops Grown on Wasted Land 
We assume that two types of crop are grown on the wasted acreage. Cotton will be
grown on the cotton producing acres and com, peas, and fodder will be grown on the com, 
wheat, rye, and oat acres (for simplicity, grain acres). Yield per acre for cotton and com was 
determined by dividing the total crop output by total acres of that particular crop. For the 
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com yield per acre measure we subtract 0.25 bushels per acre for seed. 92 The yield per acre of
peas and fodder is assumed to be 4 bushels and 185 pounds, respectively, as reported in the 
"Annual Report of Thomas P. Janes Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Georgia 
For the Year 1 875," p. 135. The total crop of com, peas, and fodder grown on the extra land 
brought into cultivation is equal to the number of extra grain acres times the yield per acre of 
the respective crop. Similarly, the total extra cotton crop is equal to the extra cotton acres 
times the yield per acre of cotton. Since the yield per acre is reported in bales, we multiply 
the total output by 475, the average weight of a bale of cotton, to obtain total pounds of extra 
cotton grown. 93 
3.) Gross Value of Crops Grown on Wasted Land 
After finding the total number of bushels or pounds of each crop that could be grown 
on the wasted acreage, we multiply the figure by the price per unit The price of cotton is
assumed to be $0. 1 1 1 8  per pound and com is assumed to be $0.673 per bushel. These are the 
average prices for the year 1880 as reported in the Atlanta Constitution. We sampled the 
newspaper once every month, trying to obtain prices for the fourth day of each month. If the 
price was not reported on the fifth, we went to the sixth, seventh, and so on. The price of 
peas is assumed to be $1.10 per bushel and fodder $0.0119 per pound as reported in 'The 
Annual Report ... 1875," p. 135. 
4.) Cost of Producing Crops 
"The Annual Report ... 1875," p. 135, reports the cost of producing com, peas, and 
fodder on the same land as $8.00 per acre. Assuming an interest rate of 7 percent. an annual
land depreciation rate of2.7 percent,94 and a cash value per acre of Georgia farms of $4.67,
the cost of producing the com, peas, and fodder becomes $8.45 per acre.95 We have the 
benefit of two cost estimates for couon. "The Annual Report .. 1875," p. 135, reports the 
production cost of cotton to be $16.48 per acre, and includes the cost of marketing the crop. 
R.H. Loughridge, "Report on the Cotton Production of the State of Georgia, with a 
Description of the General Agricultural Features of the State," in the 1�80 Agricultural 
Census, p. 175, has several cost estimates for various counties within Georgia Loughrldge's
figures correspond very closely to the $16.48 reported by the Georgia Department of 
Agriculture and, thus, we use this estimate to predict the total cost of producing the extra 
cotton crop, with one adjustment. The $16.48 figure includes the cost of fencing the acre of 
cotton land. Therefore, the "real" cost of planting an acre of cotton becomes $14.58 (se
section 6, below, for $1.90 fence cost). It should be noted that this estimate inciudes the 
rental price of the land. 
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An additional cost of producing the extra crops is the opportunity cost of the capital 
used to work the land, specifically any machinery, farm implements, or draft animals. We 
first determine the value of machinery capital per acre by dividing the "value of farming 
implements and machinery" by the total number of cotton, com, wheat, rye, and oat acres. 
To estimate the machinery rent associated with producing the extra crop, we multiply the per 
acre value of machinery by the total acres brought into cultivation by the depreciation and 
interest rate. We take the rate of depreciation to be 15 percent, following Ransom and Sutch, 
p. 108, and Robert C. Allen. 96 Again, the interest rate is assumed to be 7 percent. 
To find the rent associated with work animals, we need to determine the total value 
of such animals, because the Census reports the value of all farm animals. Using the 1879 
prices given in the Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957, Series K
195-212, p. 290, for horses ($51.55), mules ($57.08), and all cattle ($16.96), we are able to 
estimate the total value of capital in the form of horses, mules, and oxen. By the same 
procedure used for machinery and implements, we determine the value per acre of work 
animals used to produce all crops within a county. Using a depreciation rate of 15 percent 
(Allen, p. 952) and an interest rate of 7 percent, the total rent for animals associated with 
producing the additional crops is the value of work animals per acre times 22 percent times 
the total number of wasted acres brought into cultivation. 
5.) Dealing with Animals 
Because many animals were roaming the open range, we need to take into account 
the pasturing and feeding of these animals once the hypothetical stock law is implemented. 
The Census reports acres of "Permanent meadows, Permanent pastures, orchards, and 
vineyards" and we will take this lump sum to represent the total amount of land devoted to 
animal pasture. The "Annual Report .. .  1875" gives data on total pasture enclosed by fence, 
and for more than 80 counties, the Georgia Department of Agriculture reports a pasture 
measure greater than the Census' enhanced pasture statistic. Therefore, we do not believe 
that using the Census pasture variable will bias the result in any dramatic fashion. 
To this permanent pasture we allocate animals so that we are able to estimate the 
number of animals that were roaming the countryside. We first allocate 5 sheep per acre of 
pasturage ("Annual Report. .. 1 875," p. 128), then sequentially allocate one horse, mule, ox, 
milk cow, head of cattle per acre, and if possible, 5 swine per acre. The Jackson Herald, 
August 31,  1883, reports that six cows and twelve hogs could be put on a six acre pasture 
sown in vetch for the summer. Moreover, the March 30, 1 885 Herald reported that one acre 
of pasture per cow was suitable. Given this. we believe one acre devoted to each horse, mule. 
ox, head of cattle, and milk cow is a generous estimate. Furthermore, five pigs per acre 
seems reasonable, given that five sheep per acre was the norm, and taking into account the 
Herald's 1883 advice. 
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Once we determine the number of animals that were non-pastured, we must deduct 
from our savings estimate a feed allowance for these animals. Before the stock law is 
instituted, we assume that farmers fed their non-pastured animals the Ransom and Sutch 
"Lower bound'.' feed estimate reported in Table E.4, p. 250. Once the hypothetical law is 
implemented, these animals must be put into pastures and we assume that they are now fed 
the Ransom and Sutch "Reasonable allowance, 1880" of corn-equivalent bushels. Of course, 
we need not allocate feed to previously pastured animals because we assume they were fed 
the "Reasonable allowance" before and after the law. In fact. the feed allowance only has to 
be made for horses, mules, and oxen because grain given to milk cows, cattle, and swine was 
consumed by the farm family in a different form, namely meat, milk, cheese, butter, etc. 
Therefore, the dollar value of the feed is equal to $0.673/bushel corn * (nphorses * 1 1 .7 
bushels + npoxen * 1 1.7 bushels + npmules * 14.5 bushels), where "np" represents 
"non-pastured. 11 
6.) Fence Maintenance Savings 
Contemporaries claimed that the depreciation of fences amounted to 10 percent of 
the initial value of the fence. However, as described above, previously non-pastured animals 
require a fence enclosure, and we will assume that these animals are penned on unimproved 
land.97 We assume that each non-pastured horse, mule, ox, head of cattle, and milk cow was 
given one acre of land and one acre was allocated for 5 sheep and swine. Let us call the land 
used to pasture the previously non-pastured animals, "new fenced acres." In addition, we 
have assumed that all of the fences around crops are removed and, thus, no longer require 
repair expense. Call the amount of land used to grow the cotton and grain crops before the 
hypothetical stock law, "crop acres." Using the fact that the average cost of fencing in the 
South was $1.90 per acre, we are able to estimate the amount saved from maintaining fewer 
fences. Thus, the fence savings is equal to 0.10 * $1.90 * (crop acres - new fenced acres). 
We also must take into account the cost of fencing the "new fenced acres" devoted to 
penning the animals. Denoting the onCHime cost of this fence as C 0, its value is given by 
$1.90 * (new fenced acres). 
7.) Total Expected Savings 
The total annual expected savings once the hypothetical law is passed is obtained by 
adding the gross value of the additional crops grown and the money saved from maintaining 
fewer fences and subtracting the total cost of producing the crop, including the rent on the 
capital, a.. ... � t.1le value of t11e feed allowa..71.ce given to previously non--pasti..ira....d horses, mules, 
and oxen. A general equation for the savings after the first year can be written as: 
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Total expected savings (S) = x % cotton acres • [bales/acre • 475 lbs/bale • $0. 1 1 19/lb ­
$14.58 cost/acre - $rent of capital/acre] + x% grain acres * [(bushels com/acre * 
$0.673/bushel + 4 bushels peas/acre • $1.10/bushel + 185 lbs fodder/acre • $0.01 19/lb) 
- $8.45 cost/acre - $rent of capital/acre] - $0.673, bushel com * [ 1 1 .7 bushels • 
nphorses + 1 1 .7 bushels • npoxen + 14.5 bushels • npmules] + 0.10 • $1.90 • [crop 
acres - new fenced acres], 
where x % represents the percentage of tilled acreage wasted by fence rows. The savings of 
the first year that the law is in force is slightly different. All of the profits from the crops as 
well as the depreciation from the crop acre fences are realized as savings. However, in the 
first year the full value of C 0 is subtracted off and the depreciation from these fences need not 
-
be subtracted. Thus, the net present value of the expected savings is I;S, - 0.9 C 0, where 0.9
t-0 
C0 is the cost of the animals' fences plus the first year's depreciation which is embedded in 
the s, term. 
APPENDIX B 
Data Appendix 
As discussed in the text, we used three primary sources for our data: the Population 
and Agricultural Manuscript Schedules of the 1880 Census, as well as published census data, 
contemporary newspapers, and property tax digests from Carroll and Jackson counties, which 
are housed in the Georgia Department of Archives and History. This Appendix discusses the 
procedural details behind the creation of the variables found in Tables 7 and 8. 
The fence election data was culled from contemporary newspapers, specified in the 
sources of Tables 4 and 5. For the statistical analyses in this paper, we used the percentage of 
the eligible voters who cast ballots for the fence law, stock law, or who did not vote as our 
dependent variables. Therefore, it was necessary to create an accurate count of the electorate 
to use as a common denominator. Although the property tax digests record the number of 
men who paid the poll tax, Kousser (The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction 
and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-19 JO (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1974), chapter 3) argues that tax collectors purposefully avoided collecting the tax 
from those who they deemed undesirable voters, such as Republican black voters. A more 
accurate description of the eligible voting population would be the number of men 
twenty--0ne years of age or older. However, the Census only reported this data for the whole 
county and not the individual militia districts. Tnerefore, our strategy in estimating the 
potential electorate was to inflate the number of black and white polls reported in the tax 
digest for individual districts to a level commensurate with the Census' count of males 21 
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years or older. 
We first detennined the total number of black and white voting age males within 
each county for 1880 using our 100 percent sample of the Population Manuscript Schedules. 
In the published 1890 Population Census, voting age males of both races are reported. Using 
a linear interpolation between the 1880 and 1890 census data, we have countywide estimates 
of the number of potential voters for the 1 880s. The next step was to find the total number of
men, black and white, who paid the poll tax within each county for each year that a fence 
election was held. Finally, we used the ratio of the total countywide number of voting age 
males, of each race, enumerated by the Census to the countywide number of poll tax payers 
as our inflater of the number of districtwide voters reported in the tax digests. For example, 
assume that wi 1882 is the interpolated estimate of the census' total number of white voting age 
males divided by the total number of white men who paid their poll tax in Carroll county in 
1882. If district X had 100 white poll tax payers in 1882, our estimate of the "actual" number 
of white voters is lOO*wi 1882• An analogous calculation was used to detennine the "actual" 
number of black voters within district X .  Of course, the total number of potential voters in 
this hypothetical district would be the sum of the black and white estimates described above. 
The apparent undercollection of taxes was more dramatic for Carroll than for Jackson county. 
The black and white polls in Carroll had to be inflated, on average, 45 percent and 23 
percent, respectively. For Jackson county, we only had to inflate the black and white polls 30 
percent and 19 percent, respectively. 
The percent forest, percentage of tenant operated farms, per capita cotton, the 
percentage of farms achieving self-sufficiency, and the proportion expecting to profit from 
the new law were all created using the data from Agricultural Manuscript Schedules. 
Self-sufficiency was detennined using the method that Ransom and Sutch, One Kind of 
Freedom, have devised. Jn estimating the number of farms expecting to profit from the stock 
law, we followed the procedure detailed in Appendix A. 
The population density variable uses published census data from the Compendium of 
the Eleventh Census, pp. 89 and 93. We used a linear interpolation to estimate a district's 
population in years between 1880 and 1890. The density variable is the population per 
square mile, using the total district acreage aggregated from the manuscript schedules. 
Substituting tilled land for total land mass in the denominator did not change the results 
reported above. Percent black is just the percentage of the electorate, as estimated above, 
that was black. Finally, white per capita wealth is the total white taxable wealth in a district 
divided by its number of potential white voters (estimated above). Georgia tax records for 
this era are conveniently segregated by race. 
During the 1880s Carroll county saw two major internal boundary changes. Two 
new districts were created, Shiloh and Flint Comer. It was rather clear from the tax digests 
and maps (in Bonner's book) which districts were cut in order to create the new ones. Jn 
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particular, Smithfield and Carrollton were dissected to create Shiloh and, later, Flint Comer 
was created out of parts of Shiloh and Smithfield. Unfortunately, with the agricultural data 
that we have, we never observe the specific characteristics of the new districts, especially 
since the 1890 census returns are not available. Therefore, in dealing with the addition of 
these new districts, we adopted the convention that a new district obtained half of its land 
from each of its parent districts. After determining what percentage of the parent district was 
"transferred" to the new one, call it y %, we subtracted y % from the aggregated raw data for 
the parent district and added this same amount to the newly created district. For example, let 
the vectors s and f be the raw data for two districts of the same names. Assume that district 
X is created out ofS and T and we find that x % of district S is lost and y % of district T. 
Thus, the new data for districts S, T, and X will be (1-x %)S, (l-y %)T, and (x%S + y %T). 
The appropriate percentages used as independent variables were calculated using this 
adjusted data. 
Two of our variables, self-sufficiency and farms profiting from the stock law, depend 
upon farm specific data. But we do not know which farms actually changed districts as a 
result of the boundary alterations. Therefore, to create the aforementioned variables for the 
new districts, we simply take the average of the parent districts' percentages. This 
assumption should not cause statistical problems as long as the boundary changes were done 
arbitrarily, in the sense that new districts were not created so as to contain a greater majority 
of farms achieving self-sufficiency or expecting to profit from the stock law. Wealth and 
racial composition for the new districts was obtained from the tax digests. Since the 1890 
Census reported the population for the new districts, the population density variable is 
accurate. 
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TABLE l 
PERCENT CHANGE IN GEORGIA POPULATION BY RACE, BY REGION, 1850 - 1890 
REGION 1850-60 1850-60 1860-70 1860-70 1870-80 1870-80 1880-90 
WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
PLANTATION -1.17 17.64 5.20 15.92 14.63 22.72 10.93 
BELT 
UPCOUNTRY 23.43 43.42 9.93 25.64 29.64 35.19 22.22 
WIREGRASS 81.85 12653 22.66 36.74 24.43 33.71 42.17 
PINE 26.70 32.15 1 1.00 3.63 36.29 38.77 42.01 
BARRENS 
COAST 4 1 .29 -2.84 9.62 23.31 13.19 13.83 33.13 
MOUNTAIN 20.85 41.80 4.75 -16.17 20.41 21.88 16.63 
STATE 13.42 21.08 8.01 17.06 21.78 24.82 19.77 
CARROLL CO. 22.59 69.68 3.53 -30.19 28.22 43.33 26.45 
JACKSON CO. 6.48 13.38 3.06 10.55 32.93 28.06 23.71 
Sources: Population Census, 1870, pp. 20...22; Compendium of the Tenth Census, 1880, pp. 341-343; 
Compendium of the Eleventh Census, 1890, pp. 12-3 & 590-5. 
1880-90 
BLACK 
1 1.99 
23.46 
73.84 
57.87 
25.92 
-1.05 
18.46 
66.71 
4.63 
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TABLE 2 
ALLOCATION OF LABOR SERVICES FOR FARMS USING WAGE LABOR ­
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATION 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 
CONSTANT -132.99 
(-1.53) 
COTTON ACREAGE 2.39 
(3.18) 
GRAIN ACREAGE 2.17 
(4.00) 
VALUE OF FARM 0.02 
(1.85) 
DRAFT ANIMALS 22.64 
(3.45) 
COWS -10.67 
(-1.20) 
SWINE 0.28 
(0.21) 
CATTLE 8.82 
(2.02) 
POUNDS OF BUTIER -.01 
PRODUCED (--0.14) 
CARROLL COUNTY -59.57 
DUMMY (-5.86) 
OWNER-OCCUPPIED 25.67 
FARM DUMMY (2.22) 
FARM < 25 1 19.07 
ACRES (1.45) 
FARM 25 - 49 78.77 
ACRES (l.00) 
FARM 50 - 99 61.02 
ACRES (0.81) 
FARM 100 - 199 56.14 
ACRES (0.75) 
FARM > 300 76.98 
ACRES (0.68) 
N 977 
Rz 0.47 
0.46 
Notes: 
Source: 
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I-statistics are in parentheses. The fann size variables are dummies for acreage classes. For 
example, if a fann's improved acreage was less than twenty-live acres, its value on the "fann <
25 acres" variable was I; otherwise, the value for this variable was zero. The other four fann 
size variables are defined analogously. The regression equation was corrected for 
heteroskedasticity using Halbert White's method, "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance 
Matrix Estimation and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, 48 (May 1980), pp. 
817-838. 
Manuscript Agricultural Schedules of Carroll and Jackson counties, Georgia. The data set 
includes all fanns that the Census Bureau enumerated. 
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TABLE 3 
OCCUPATIONS OF HOUSEHOLD HEADS, CARROLL AND JACKSON COUNTIES, 1880 
% WHITE HOUSEHOLD HEADS % BLACK HOUSEHOLD HEADS 
OCCUPATION CARROLL JACKSON CARROLL JACKSON 
FARMER" 45.3 43.6 5.4 5.1 
FARMER (NO REAL ESTATE) 25.3 10.0 37.0 4.0 
TRADE• 2.9 2.3 0.0 0.1 
PROFESSIONALc 3.1 3.1 0.8 0.5 
SERVICE• 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0 
SKILLED, SEMISKILLED' 4.5 3.8 1.8 1.2 
UNSKILLED 
-FARM LABORER• 13.6 34.9 41.1 86.2 
-OTHER LABORER 5.0 2.0 13.6 2.9 
OTHER 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 
NI 2683 2086 389 896 
Agricultural N 2264 . 1845 325 854 
Notes: a The numbers in the "farmer" and "farm laborer" rows are substantially different from those that 
Hahn reports. The reason is that 253 white and 44 black household heads in Carroll and 173
whites and 34 blacks in Jackson reported their occupations as "farmer," but were not recorded in 
the agricultural census. We, therefore, considered these individuals as farm laborers. 
b Includes merchants, grocers, and other shopkeepers. 
c Includes lawyers, physicians, clergymen, teachers, and political officials. 
d Includes hotel, stable, and saloon keepers. 
e Includes artisans and helpers likely to acquire a skill such as "works in blacksmith shop".
f Does not include household heads reporting no occupation, "keeping house,• or "student,• and 
does not include persons in jail or in the poor house. 
Source: Manuscript Population Schedules of Carroll and Jackson counties, Georgia. The data set includes 
all households that the Census Bureau enumerated. 
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Table 4 
Carroll County Fence Election Returns 
District January September July July July 
1882 1882 1885 1887 1890 
Fence Stock Fence Stock Fence Stock Fence Stock Fence Stock 
Carrollton 225 257 343 295 295 220 233 223 105 120 
Whitesburg 181 31 207 5 1  108 40 90 60 46 43 
Temple 121 92 167 106 155 97 55 25 _c -c 
Kansas 90 14 92 21 92 21 67 30 20 19 
Turkey Creek 93 20 95 34 66 25 57 39 -c _c 
Bowdon 158 28 168 47 146 45 91 46 49 55 
Smithfield 138 3 183 18 123 3 130 4 44 5 
Shiloh" - - - - 72 20 58 39 _c _c 
Flint Comer' - - - - - - - - 24 5 
New Mexico 88 14 116 12 74 13 92 21 52 12' 
Lowell 135 8 146 20 120 30 121 26 89 26 
Cross Plains 87 13 122 25 128 28 1 18 39 39 8 
County Line 42 14 60 36 37 33 33 37 -· -· 
I I I 
Fairplay 1 15  35 147 37 52 67 42 43 5 13 
Villa Rica 56 69 71 70 47 101 55 61 _c -c 
Roopville 86 22 104 50 56 42 98 52 55 24 
Total 1615 620 2021 822 1571 785 1340 745 528 332 
Percentages 72.3 27.7 71.l 28.9 66.7 33.3 64.3 35.7 61.4 38.6 
Turnout 62.3 79.2 59.9 50.2 19.1 
Notes: 
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•Shiloh was, for the most part, created from pans of Carrollton and Smithfield. See Appendix 
B for a discussion of our handling of newly created districts. 
b Flint Comer was created from parts of Smithfield and Shiloh. See Appendix B for a 
discussion of our handling of newly created districts. 
c No fence election held. 
d No data reported. 
'The stock law vote reported in our original source is 2 votes. However, analysis of the time­
series data showed that this nwnber was an extreme outlier and caused abnormal results in our 
computation of tranSition probabilities. Given our suspicion of the nwnber reported in the 
contemporary newspaper, we asswned that the stock law vote decreased at the same rate as the 
fence law vote between 1887 and 1890. 
Sources: Carroll County Times, January 13, 1882; Carroll County Times, September 15, 1882; Carroll 
Free Press, July 3, 1885; Carroll Free Press, July 8, 1887; Carroll Free Press, July 4, 1890. 
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Table 5 
Jackson County Fence Election Returns 
District July September 
1881 1883 
Fence Stock Fence Stock 
Jefferson 317 128 124 83 
Harrisburg" - - 101 115 
Harmony Grove 149 101 131 102 
Newtown 179 3 1  170 46 
Clarkesboro 89 17 121 66 
Santa Fe 58 4 66 5 
Chandler 174 4 1 19 1 1  
House 84 46 93 33 
Randolph 132 18 190 32 
Miller 34 13 53 33 
Cunningham 77 75 83 84 
Wilson 86 4 1  67 31 
Total 1379 478 1318 641 
Percentages 74.3 25.7 67.3 32.7 
Turnout 54.5 57.5 
Notes: "Harrisburg was reported as part of Jefferson in 1881. Therefore, in the statistical analyses the 
districts are considered a single district for 1881.
Sources: Jackson Herald, July 8, 1881; Jackson Herald, September 14, 1883. 
ELECTION 1 
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TABLE 6 
TRANSITION MATRICES - CARROLL AND JACKSON 
Panel A: Carroll County - Election 1 to Election 2 
% Fence 
% Stock 
% Abstain 
Mean of Colwnn 
% Fence 
0.920 
0.036 
0.286 
0.603 
ELECTION 2 
% Stock % Abstain Mean of Row 
0.052 0.028 0.496 
0.671 0.293 0.135 
0.196 0.518 0.369 
0.197 0.200 
ELECTION 2 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
TRANSITION MATRICES - CARROLL AND JACKSON 
Panel B: Carroll County - Election 2 to Election 3
% Fence 
% Stock 
% Abstain 
Mean of Column 
% Fence 
0.764 
0.015 
0.178 
0.430 
ELECTION 3 
% Stock % Abstain Mean of Row 
0.034 0.202 0.603 
0.500 0.485 0.197 
0.590 0.233 0.200 
0.181 0.390 
ELECTION 1 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
TRANSITION MATRICES - CARROLL AND JACKSON 
Panel C: Jackson County - Election 1 to Election 2 
% Fence 
% Stock 
% Abstain 
Mean of Column 
% Fence 
0.660 
0.002 
0.283 
0.383 
ELECTION 2 
% Stock % Abstain Mean of Row 
0.023 0.317 0.400 
0.994 0.004 0.139 
0.107 0.610 0.461 
0.181 0.436 
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TABLE 7 
CORRELATION BETWEEN V ARIABLF.'i 
Variable Percent Density Percent Percent 
Forest Tenanu Black 
Forest -
Density -0.21a -
Tenants 0.19 --0.05 -
Black --0.47. 0.15 -0.23a -
Cotton --0.3 1 b --0.45. 0.224 0.05 
Self-Suf. 0.06 0.264 --0.43. --0.05 
Wealth --0.31• 0.40• 0.12 o.� 
Profit -0.2411 0.00 0.02 0.35. 
Fence o.2s• --0.47. --0.03 --0.31 b 
Stock --0.17 0.10 0.21a 0.22a 
Abstain --0.19 0.42. --0.07 0.214 
Notes: a Significant at the S percent level 
b Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Sources: See Appendix B 
Per Cap. Self- Per Cap. 
Collon Sufficiency Wealth 
-
--0.14 -
--0.31' 0.00 -
0.3'1' 0.06 0.13 
0.03 --0.10 --0.21• 
--0.03 --0.08 o.s5• 
--0.02 0.14 0.01 
Stock Law Per=n Percent Percent 
Profitability Fence Stock Abstain 
-
--0.31• -
o.2s• -0.24a -
0.17 --0.ss• -0.24a -
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TABLE S 
REGRESSIONS OF FENCE VOTING PERCENTAGES, ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
VARIABLES % FENCE LAW % STOCK LAW % ABSTAIN1NG 
CONSTANT 71.729 -1.067 29.338 
(3.386) (--0.089) (1 .409) 
% FOREST 0.266 --0.017 --0.249 
(1 .445) (--0. 162) (-1.377) 
POPULATION --0.149 0.011 0.138 
DENSITY (--0.859) (0. 1 16) (0.807) 
% TENANT FARMS --0.107 0.107 --0.000 
(--0.757) (1 .348) (--0.002) 
% BLACK --0.398 --0.043 0.441 
(-2.1 1 1) (--0.408) (2.382) 
PER CAPITA -8.591 -4.412 13.003 
COTTON (--0.555) (--0.507) (0.855) 
% SELF-SUFFICIENT --0.083 --0.010 0.093 
(--0.561) (--0. 1 18) (0.639) 
PER CAPITA --0.006 0.018 --0.0 1 1  
WHITE WEAL TH (--0.792) (3.870) (-1.410) 
% FARMS PROFITING --0.327 0.186 0.141 
FROM STOCK LAW (-2.175) (2.200) (0.953) 
STOCK LAW -20.378 0.868 19.509 
DISTRICTS, 1887 (-4.043) (0.306) (3.938) 
STOCK LAW -32.367 -7.856 40.223 
DISTRICTS, 1890 (-5.858) (-2.526) (7.407) 
N 92 92 92 
Rz 0.572 0.428 0.587 
R2 0.520 0.358 0.536 
C O S T ( $ )
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ANIMALS (Q) 
FIGURE ! 
When Animals Can Graze on All Unfenced Land, Ownen Will Inctaa !be Slza of Their Herds 
More Than Tiiey Would If'Ibey Had 10 Pay for All of the Animals' Food and W.ar. 
Legend: SMC • Socil1 MllJinal Cost 
PMC • Priv.a Marpna1 Cost 
SMB • Social Marzi,nll Benefil
PMB • Privlltll MUJina1 Benefit
Notes: 1-stati.stics in pareruheses. Appendix B gives more detailed description of variables 
and data. 
Sou�s: See Appendix B. 
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FIGURE 2 
Farmers Forced to Fence Out Animals Will Invest Less in Land and Other Improvements Than 
They Would Under a Stock Law. 
Legend: SMC • Social Marginal Cost 
PMC ., Private Marginal Cost 
SMB ,. Social Marginal Benefit 
PMB = Private Marginal Benefit 
FIGURE 3 :  RELATIVE PRICES OF COTTON AND CORN TO BACON S IDES 
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FIGURE 3 
Notes: The squares correspond to the cotton series and the triangles to the com 
price series. 
Sources: Atiama Co11Stitution. i 870-i890. See Appendix A, section 3 for a
discussion of our sampling procedure. 
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FIGU RE 4 
Panel A:  Voter Turnout by Group 
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B Group e 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
Percent 
40 
30 
20 
1 0  
0 
1 885 
FIGURE 4 (continued)
Panel B :  Percent for Fence Law by Group
1 887 
Election 
1 890 District 
Election 
• Group A
• Group B
fl Group e 
F!GURE 4 
Notes: Group A districts are those that adopted the stock law at the district level 
by the time of the 1887 countywide election. Group B distticts adopted 
the sroclc law after the 1887 election. but before the 1890 poll. Finally.
thosi: districts in Group C did not adopt the new law until after 1890. 
Sources: See Table 4. Appendix B contains a discussion of our estimation of the 
size of the electorate. 
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paper's remaining shortcomings. 
1. Coase's words eerily echo those of an 1878 Sparta, Georgia farmer: "A. owns a
tract of land and wishes to plant it in various crops. B. owns a tract of land joining it
and wishes to raise stock. A's crop will not leave his land to go on B's land to injure 
B's stock; but B's stock will go on A's land and destroy his crop. Now which is in 
fault, A's crop or B's stock? Certain! y B's stock, and B should be forced to fence his
stock, and be made liable for damages . . . .  " David Dickson, in SoUJhern Cultivator, 
36 (December 1878), p. 451.
2. Lance E. Davis and Douglas C. North, Institutional Change and American Economic 
Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
3. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economlcs'(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1985). Economists' mathematical models and statistical tests, McCloskey 
claims, are only "figures of speech" (p. xvii). "Economics is a collection of literary 
forms, not a science." (p.55) 'While denying that he favors "irrationalism", the ever 
provocative McCloskey avers that "there is no reason to search for a general quality 
called Truth . . . .  Truth is a fifth wheel. . .  " (pp. 48-49)
4. Steven H. Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism: Yeoman Fanners and the
Transformation of the Georgia Upcountry, 1850--1890 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), pp. 60--63, pp. 239-68.
5. GA Session Laws 1872, No. 329, pp. 34-6. In 1881, militia districts were permitted 
to hold fence elections. See GA Session Laws, 1881, No. 401, pp. 7�1. In certain 
cases, throughout the late nineteenth century, the stock law was imposed by the state 
legislature, without referenda. 
6. Hahn, Roots, pp. 240-53.
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7. Charles L. Flynn, Jr., White Land, Black Labor: Caste and Class in Late Nineteenth 
Century Georgia (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1983), p.
128. 
8. Ibid., p. 131.
9. Ibid., pp. 1 1�9.
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12. Ibid., p. 68.
13. James C. Bonner, Georgia's Last Frontier: The Development of Carroll County 
(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1971), p. 143.
14. Ibid., p. 139.
15. Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of law and Economics, 3
(October 1960), pp. 1-44. Transactions costs include the costs of bargaining, 
information, supervision, enforcement, measurement, and political action. See 
Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew L. Spitzer, "The Coase Theorem: Some 
Experimental Results," Journal of law and Economics, 25 (April 1982), p. 73, for 
an extensive list of Coase 's assumptions. 
16. A contract is Pareto-efficient if it specifies the actions of all agents and any 
redistribution of income and there exists no other contract which will make everyone 
at least as well off (in utility terms) and at least one agent strictly better off. 
Therefore, if C is the status quo contract, C '  is Pareto-improving if it makes at least 
one person strictly better off without making anyone else worse off. 
17. H. Scott Gordon, "The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The 
Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, 62 (April 1954), pp. 124-42.
18. For our purposes a "socially optimal" use of a resource occurs when agents 
compieteiy take into account the social costs and benefits of their actions. If
individuals do not take consider the externality that they impose on others, for
example, those being adversely affected might be willing to pay the perpetrators to 
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cease their hannful actions. In this case, a social optimum results from a reallocation 
of resources such that Pareto efficiency is achieved. 
19. See, for example, George J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell
Journal Economics and Management Science, 2 (Spring 1971), pp. 3-21;  Sam 
Peltzman, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and 
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optimality of a certain reallocation of resources - should it follow the Paneto 
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